Sunday, January 24, 2016

Department of Defense (DoD) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)

Department of Defense (DoD) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration
into the National Airspace System (NAS)
Domestic Use and Integration of Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft Systems
The Department of Defense (DoD) currently operates over 11,000 unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), domestically and overseas; differing in size, technologies and capabilities, and supporting a wide range of missions.  The Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, provides specific and stringent guidance for the domestic use of DoD UAS (Department of Defense (DoD), n.d.).  The primary purposes of DoD domestic UAS operations are to provide realistic training and exercises for DoD forces, to test equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in preparation for DoD operations, and “…to support Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) operations…” (DoD, n.d., para. 1).
Current Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airspace Integration Method
Unlike manned aircraft, DoD UAS are not permitted unencumbered entrance into, or use of, the National Airspace System (NAS).  Instead, for DoD UAS operations conducted outside of DoD special use airspace (e.g., Restricted Areas, Warning Areas, Prohibited Areas, Military Operations Areas (MOA), etc.), a temporary Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA), issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is required which “…allows DoD UAS to fly via pre-coordinated flight routes to DoD special use airspace” (DoD, n.d., para. 4).  Although the DoD has been able to coordinate flights through this process, the level of airspace access required to support current and projected operational tempos has not been obtained (DoD, n.d.; DoD, 2011).
Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airspace Integration Plan
The DoD Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan, Version 2.0, prepared by the UAS Task Force, Airspace Integration Integrated Product Team, leverages policy, procedures, technologies and resources in order to safely increase UAS access to, and integration in, the NAS.  Incremental efforts are focused on near-, mid- and far-term objectives that will allow for immediate (near-term) improvements in NAS access, while developing appropriate technologies (i.e., sense-and-avoid) and working towards viable far-term solutions which will safely allow routine access for DoD UAS within the NAS (DoD, 2011; Statement on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 2013).
Discussion
Sense and Avoid
The DoD Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan (2011) defines sense and avoid (SAA) as “the capability of a UAS to remain well clear from, and avoid collisions with, other airborne traffic.  Sense and avoid provides the functions of self-separation and collision avoidance to fulfill the regulatory requirement of see and avoid” (p. A-2).  The development and implementation of the SAA capability is divided into both mid- and far-term objectives.  Mid-term objectives include the development and fielding of ground based SAA (GBSAA) radar systems that will provide the UAS/operator with traffic information within the operating airspace; thus enabling the UAS to maintain a safe separation from other aircraft (MITRE, 2013).  Far-term objectives include the development, certification and fielding of airborne SAA (ABSAA) radar system, which will act “…as a replacement for the see and avoid capability of the pilot onboard a manned aircraft” (Lester, Cook & Noth, 2014, p. 6); and the collaboration, or integration, of GBSAA and ABSAA systems (DoD, 2011).
Next Generation Air Transportation System
The FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is a comprehensive overhaul of the NAS from a “…ground-based, largely analog air traffic control system into a satellite-based digital system” (Dillow, 2013, para. 20) that will provide the capability to guide and track air traffic more precisely and efficiently by “...using tools like enhanced data links to share more and better information between controllers, pilots, and aircraft themselves” (Dillow, 2013, para. 20).  NextGen improvements and upgrades which have direct application to UAS integration include the NAS Voice System (NVS), which “…will enable direct communication between air traffic controllers and pilots, including UAS pilots” (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 2015, p. 19), automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast, which “…is the more precise, satellite-based successor to radar” (FAA, 2015, p. 4), and separation management, which includes UAS flight planning and ATC direct communications (FAA, 2015).  In addition, technologies currently being developed, tested and demonstrated for the DoD, such as secure, low-latency data networks, precision global positioning system (GPS) and relative positioning, can potentially be integrated into NextGen in order to address concerns about both civilian and DoD UAS operation with, and avoidance of, manned aircraft in the NAS (Dillow, 2013).
The “Human Factor”
A main concern with the integration of any UAS into the NAS remains the absence of a pilot in the aircraft.  In a manned aircraft, the pilot has the advantage of “...visual, auditory, proprioceptive, tactile, and olfactory sensory cues...” (Jones, Harron, Hoffa, Lyall & Wilson, 2012, p. 98), which may not be available to the controller/operator of a UAS, to better respond to unplanned situations and/or events.   One method of addressing this concern is to incorporate additional sensors, cameras, displays, etc., for the UAS pilot/operator to compensate for both the loss of sensory cues and situational awareness.  In doing so, however, additional issues, such as timeliness of information, increased attention requirements and sensory overload, could be introduced (Jones et al., 2012, p. 98).        
Conclusion
Integration of DoD UAS into the NAS will enhance the ability for DoD UAS pilots and operators to train at home; allowing them to conduct exercises, test equipment, execute and hone TTP, and maintain a high level of combat readiness in order to support ongoing operations world-wide.  Additionally, the ability to provide timely support to HD and DCSA, provide disaster relief, etc. will require improved NAS access for DoD UAS.  Finally, the integration of new and advanced DoD UAS technologies could help mitigate the “human factor” concern, and improve the effectiveness of the FAA NextGen effort.

References
Department of Defense. (n.d.). Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS): DoD purpose and operational use. Retrieved January 23, 2016, from http://www.defense.gov/UAS
Department of Defense. (2011, March). Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan, Version 2.0. Retrieved from http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/DoD_UAS_Airspace_Integ_Plan_v2_(signed).pdf
Dillow, C. (2013, July 5). What the X-47B reveals about the future of autonomous flight. Popular Science. Retrieved from http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/five-things-you-need-know-about-x-47b-and-coming-era-autonomous-flight
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, May). NextGen implementation plan 2015.  Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/NextGen_Implementation_Plan-2015.pdf
Jones, E., Harron, G., Hoffa, B., Lyall, B. & Wilson, J. (2012, December 31). Research project: Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) ground control station (GCS) design. Retrieved from http://www.researchintegrations.com/publications/Jones_etal_2012_Human-Factors-Guidelines-for-UAS-GCS-Design_Year-1.pdf
Lester, T., Cook, S. & Noth, K. (2014, January 31). USAF airborne sense and avoid (ABSAA) airworthiness and operational approval approach. Retrieved from http://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/usaf-airborne-sense-avoid-13-3116.pdf
MITRE. (2013, August). Enabling unmanned aircraft systems to detect and avoid other aircraft. Retrieved from http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/enabling-unmanned-aircraft-systems-to-detect-and-avoid-other-aircraft
Statement of Mr. Dyke D. Weatherington, Deputy Director, Unmanned Warfare Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 113th Cong. (2013, April 23)

Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) Ground Control Systems (GCS)

Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) Ground Control Systems (GCS)
Ground Control Systems
The primary objectives of the Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program was not only to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) into carrier operations, but to also evolve and mature the technologies involved with launching, recovering and controlling the aircraft in carrier controlled airspace operations.  Included among these technologies were the UAS ground control systems (GCSs), which consist of mission operator control and flight deck control (Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), n.d.; USS Theodore Roosevelt Public Affairs, 2013).
Mission Operator Control
The Northrop Grumman X-47B, developed under contract as the Navy’s UCAS-D platform, is a smart, fully autonomous, unmanned system.  Like current manned aircraft, the X-47B is capable of launching from, and being recovered by, an aircraft carrier; using inputs from internal computers and sensors, as well as inputs from operators, sensors, etc. onboard the carrier.  The flight path and mission of the X-47B are preprogrammed, and are executed, or “flown,” by the onboard computer.  Navigation of the aircraft is accomplished via a hybrid system consisting of embedded global positioning system/inertial navigation system (EGI) and vision-based technology.  While the onboard computer is responsible flight and mission execution, it does not control the X-47B in that it does not generate its own instructions or deviate from its preprogrammed instructions unless directed to do so by the mission operator.  The mission operator monitors system operations and makes changes, corrections, etc. to the flight path and/or mission as necessary using keyboard commands.  Therefore, the mission operator always knows, and is ultimately in control of, the system’s flight path and mission (Dillow, 2013; Honeywell Aerospace, 2015; Naval Technology, n.d.; Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2012).
Flight Deck Control
During flight operations, the X-47B must be able to safely maneuver around an aircraft carrier’s crowded and hectic flight deck while maintaining the operational tempo of launches and recoveries.  To accomplish this, the X-47B uses a handheld wireless control display unit (CDU), which gives a deck operator the ability to manipulate the aircraft’s throttle, steering, brakes, etc., in order to perform the numerous actions required with maneuvering an aircraft on a carrier’s flight deck.  Like a manned aircraft, the X-47B is guided around the flight deck by a flight deck director standing in front of the aircraft and using traditional hand signals to communicate when, where and how an aircraft should move.  However, instead of an onboard pilot responding to the signals and maneuvering the aircraft, a flight deck operator standing behind the flight deck director uses the CDU to control the aircraft based on the director’s instructions (Cenciotti, 2012; Quick, 2012; Skillings, 2012).  In addition to the CDU,
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have developed a system that allows a camera and computer to recognize the hand signals sailors use to guide unmanned aerial vehicles around the flight deck, a feat that could eventually enable sailors to move a UAV with little more than a wave. (Stewart, 2012, para. 2)
Discussion
Human Factors Issues
Two primary human factors issues that are of concern with UAS are the “human factor” and cyber susceptibility and vulnerability.  In a manned aircraft, the presence of the pilot offers various advantages in such areas as field of view (sensor limitations), situational awareness, and unplanned situations and events.  Not all situations, such as unplanned targets, threats and/or conditions, can be anticipated or planned for; therefore, human intuition and cognizance, not a sensor, is better equipped to make decisions based on information and/or “...visual, auditory, proprioceptive, tactile, and olfactory sensory cues...” (Jones, Harron, Hoffa, Lyall & Wilson, 2012, p. 98) that may not be available to the controller/operator of a UAS.
A second issue is cyber susceptibility and vulnerability.  The primary link between a UAS and operator is via direct, line-of-sight (LOS), or indirect satellite communication.  These wireless, extended lines of communication provide multiple “soft” access points that are more vulnerable to atmospheric interference, system malfunctions (e.g., lost links) and manipulation or exploitation by unauthorized personnel (e.g., hacking) (Hartmann & Steup, 2013; Stewart, 2011).
Mitigation of Risks
A potential method of mitigating the risk due to the loss of situational awareness for the UAS operator is the incorporation of additional sensors, cameras, displays, etc. in the aircraft and mission operator control station.  However, these additions, intended to compensate for both the loss of sensory cues and a real-time outside view, may introduce additional issues or risks “...in terms of breadth of visual field, image quality, timeliness of information, and attention requirements for pilot monitoring tasks” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 98).  Additionally, these additions “...could provide potential for overloading the visual sensory channel” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 98).
The reliability and security of the data/control link is another critical UAS human factors issue.  While cyber security was not one of the technologies that the X-47B is responsible for testing or demonstrating, the aircraft did undergo extensive Naval Electromagnetic Radiation Facility (NERF) testing in order to identify, and correct, potential electromagnetic interference (EMI) issues.  While there remains lingering, and legitimate, concerns about cybersecurity, ways to mitigate actual, and potential, risks must be continuously addressed and developed in the future (Dillow, 2013; Jones et al., 2012; NAVAIR, 2012).
Conclusion
The use of UASs in carrier operations has been successfully demonstrated through the Navy’s UCAS-D program; specifically, through the X-47B.  However, there remain significant concerns with the program.  These include integration of the UAS into a true operational environment and tempo, operator situational awareness, and UAS and GCS cybersecurity.  While there are potential ways to mitigate these risks, additional concerns and risks are introduced.  As technology advances and UAS capabilities will expand, and new risks will be identified.

  References
Cenciotti, D. (2012, December 11). Video of unmanned combat air system X-47B taxi at sea shows the future of Naval aviation. The Aviationist. Retrieved from http://theaviationist.com/2012/12/11/video-x47b-truman/
Dillow, C. (2013, July 5). What the X-47B reveals about the future of autonomous flight. Popular Science. Retrieved from http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/five-things-you-need-know-about-x-47b-and-coming-era-autonomous-flight
Hartmann, K., & Steup, C. (2013). The Vulnerability of UAVs to Cyber Attacks - An Approach to the Risk Assessment. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings/d3r2s2_hartmann.pdf
Honeywell Aerospace. (2015, April 22). Honeywell technologies play critical role in aviation first for unmanned aircraft. Retrieved from https://aerospace.honeywell.com/about/media-resources/newsroom/honeywell-technologies-play-critical-role
Jones, E., Harron, G., Hoffa, B., Lyall, B. & Wilson, J. (2012, December 31). Research project: Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) ground control station (GCS) design. Retrieved from http://www.researchintegrations.com/publications/Jones_etal_2012_Human-Factors-Guidelines-for-UAS-GCS-Design_Year-1.pdf
Naval Air Systems Command. (n.d.). Unmanned combat air system demonstration. Retrieved January 20, 2016, from http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=7468CDCC-8A55-4D30-95E3-761683359B26
Naval Air Systems Command. (2012, May 15). X-47B gears up for summer milestones. Retrieved from http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.NAVAIRNewsStory&id=4995
Naval Technology. (n.d.). X-47B unmanned combat air system carrier (UCAS), United States of America. Retrieved January 20, 2016 from http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/x-47b-unmanned-combat-air-system-carrier-ucas/
Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2012, December 19).  Unmanned combat air system carrier demonstration (UCAS-D). Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/X-47B_Navy_UCAS_FactSheet.pdf
USS Theodore Roosevelt Public Affairs. (2013, November 10). X-47B operates aboard Theodore Roosevelt. Retrieved from http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=77580
Quick, D. (2012, November 15). Wireless, handheld device for ground control of X-47B unmanned aircraft used. Gizmag. Retrieved from http://www.gizmag.com/x-47b-ground-remote-control/25049/
Skillings, J. (2012, November 15). Carrier-bound X-47B drone passes remote-control test. CNET. Retrieved from http://www.cnet.com/news/carrier-bound-x-47b-drone-passes-remote-control-test/
Stewart, J. (2011, September 12). Analysts say UAV progress won't kill aviation. Navy Times. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110912/NEWS/109120332/Analysts-say-UAV-progress-won-t-kill-aviation
Stewart, J. (2012, Aprill 1). The next step in directing drones: Hand signals. Navy Times. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20120401/NEWS/204010308/The-next-step-in-directing-drones-hand-signals

Case Analysis Proposal

Case Analysis Proposal:  Standardized Training Requirements for Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operators
The warfighting success of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been very well documented in recent years.  As a result of this success, the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to increase its inventory of UASs in order to meet the demand for their unique capabilities.  The DoD can acquire and deploy these technologically advanced systems, but without adequate operator training, the Services forfeit potential warfighting and tactical advantages due to misuse or underutilization of the UAS’s unique capabilities.  The skills and training requirements for UAS operators constitute a significant paradigm shift from the skill requirements and traditional training methods for pilots of manned aircraft.  These differences result from variations in, and characteristics of, interface design, system function(s) and the level of control required based on the autonomous capability of the UAS.  Each component within the DoD is responsible for identifying how, where and to what extent a particular UAS is to be employed within their respective Service; identifying the minimum standards of knowledge and skills required for operators; and creating Service-specific training programs, tailored to their unique applications and mission parameters, in order to provide initial and continuation/follow-on training for the system.
In general, training requirements are driven by a concept of operations; doctrine; tactics, techniques and procedures; directives; and/or instructions.  Within the DoD, the basis for Service-specific UAS training is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3255.01, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards, and other Service-specific training syllabi.  However, variations in the types of UASs used, acquisition strategies, program maturity, policies, regulations, manpower and even financial restrictions result in differences among the Services in their respective training programs, methods and materials.  This case study proposes a review, comparison, and analysis of current Service-specific, Joint and Allied publications which establish or define minimum knowledge and training standards for UAS operators.
Training is an essential link in establishing and maintaining the warfighting capabilities of unmanned aircraft system operators.  Failure of the Services to adequately identify, address and coordinate the unique training challenges of UASs will, unfortunately, result in a loss of combat-gained experience and an inability to effectively and efficiently employ these systems in the future.  As the proposed review will demonstrate, a comprehensive DoD training strategy is essential in order to ensure that common, standardized Joint training requirements are in place which will bring platforms and operators together; thereby improving training effectiveness and efficiency, and increasing overall combat effectiveness.