Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

The history of aviation began, essentially, with the use of unmanned aircraft (UA; Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Their use as a tool of war has evolved from hot air balloons, gliders, “aerial torpedoes” with early (e.g., crude) autopilots, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and, finally, autonomous UA (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  This evolution is not unlike the evolution of other, more common, methods of warfare.  For example, armed conflict has evolved from using swords/spears/arrows, to guns/cannons, to artillery/aircraft/bombs, to smart bombs/missiles/cruise missiles.  As technology advances, the tools of war advance.  Drone warfare is simply the next step in this evolution.  However, this next step is not an easy or straightforward one to take.

Discussion

The use of UA in combat presents a number of human factors issues, and ethical and moral dilemmas for those that employ them.

Human Factors

While there are a number of human factors issues associated with the use of drones, especially in a combat environment, a significant issue is the lack of the “human” element.  The major concern is, specifically, the absence of a pilot physically in the aircraft.  There are times in combat situations where it is advantageous, if not necessary, to have a pilot present in order to make decisions, act and/or react based on factors, conditions and information that may not be available or apparent to the operator of a UA (Stewart, 2011).  Additionally, in a manned aircraft, the pilot is able to orient himself as necessary in the cockpit (Schneider & MacDonald, 2014).  This allows the pilot to alter his point of view as the situation dictates, resulting in a larger, more continuous field of view, as opposed to the “soda straw” effect that can result from the limited field of view of the UA’s sensors (Schneider & MacDonald, 2014).  Finally, in addition to superior visual information and cues, pilots in manned aircraft also have the advantage of other perceptual cues such as auditory, olfactory, tactile, and vestibular cues which are typically not available to an operator of a UAS (Salas & Maurino, 2009).  This lack of physical influences and indicators can present a unique challenge to UAS operators, especially when having to assess problems or respond to unplanned or unexpected situations and/or events.

Ethics and Morality

The issue of warfare in and of itself raises a number of ethical and moral issues and concerns.  Add drones into the equation, and the issues and concerns become even more convoluted.  A significant concern, or rather fear, of drone warfare that is generated from the human factors issue discussed previously is that of autonomous “killer drones.”  Basically, people are afraid of drones that are able to search for and identify a target, specifically a human target, and, based solely on internal programing, determine whether or not to engage the target.  Such a system would have to have a very high level of autonomy (LoA; Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Specifically, the system would have to have very little, if any interaction with humans, even performing at a human level (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Obviously, this is not a concern with manned aircraft.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has policies in place to ensure that killer drones don’t become a reality on the battlefield.  Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, “...assigns responsibilities for the...use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2012, p. 1).  Two key elements of the directive (DOD, 2012) include:

·        “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force” (p. 2)

·        Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE). (p. 3)

These elements define the parameters of UAS use within the constraints of the law of war, which “...regulates the conduct of armed hostilities” (DoD, 2016, p. 139), and ROE, which “...delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (DoD, 2016, p. 207).

Conclusion

The utilization of drones on the battlefield reduces the number of personnel that are required to be placed “in harm’s way” in order to engage a target.  I believe that the continued use of drones is essential to national defense strategies, but only as long as they are employed within the constraints of the law of war and ROE.  Additionally, regulations governing the use of autonomous systems, such as those outlined in DODD 3000.09, are vital to ensure the moral, ethical and lawful use of drones in combat situations.  Finally, improvements in technologies will help mitigate risks due to the lack of the human element.  However, as capabilities increase, so will the fear of the killer drones.  It’s a very fine line that must be walked in this next step of modern warfare.

  

References

Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu

Department of Defense. (2012, November 21). Autonomy in weapon systems (DoD Directive 3000.09). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf

Department of Defense. (2016, January 15). Dictionary of military and associated terms (Joint Publication 1-02). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

Salas, E., & Maurino, D. (Eds.). (2009). Human Factors in Aviation (2nd Edition). Burlington, MA, USA: Academic Press.

Schneider, J., & MacDonald, J. (2014, June 16). Are manned or unmanned aircraft better on the battlefield? Retrieved from http://ciceromagazine.com/features/the-ground-truth-about-drones-manned-vs-unmanned-effectiveness-on-the-battlefield/

Stewart, J. (2011, September 12). Analysts say UAV progress won't kill aviation. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110912/NEWS/109120332/Analysts-say-UAV-progress-won-t-kill-aviation

ASCI 638 Case Analysis: A Review and Critique

The case analysis required the students to analyzing, evaluating, and developing recommendations for addressing a human factors issue associated with unmanned aerial systems operations.  The goal of this project was to demonstrate an understanding of the course topics.  Overall, I thought that the analysis provided an excellent means to research a topic of interest.  There are also a couple of aspects that would recommend reviewing and possibly changing.  First, the abstract portion of the assignment should be called what it is...a proposal  The rules for writing an abstract and the requirements for the proposal are significantly different, and the assignment was somewhat confusing.  Second, a problem that arose for me, was that my specific topic...I found out...didn’t have as much information available that pertained to the course learning outcomes/objectives.  Therefore, it was somewhat difficult to meet all the criteria of the paper.  It may have been easier (better?) for the case analysis to focus on a particular system and then discuss specific human factors associated with that system, rather than focusing on an single aspect or topic.  ASCI 602, The Air Transportation System, does this in that students pick an airline to focus their research on rather than just an aspect of airline operation.

One thing that I would liked to have seen is the incorporation of the weekly research topics into the case analysis project.  Again, ASCI 602 does this.  Each small paper that is done as an assignment is actually a portion of the final paper.  This really helps not only with the writing of the paper, but also with more in depth research on, and learning about, the topic.  I would suggest that the research topics in this course be modified to be more generic, or open, so that they can completed with respect to the students’ case analysis topic.  This would also lend itself better to supporting a case analysis topic that focused on a specific platform rather than a specific issue.

The peer reviews of the abstract (proposal) and rough draft were also interesting assignments.  This was the first instance where I was required to perform peer reviews.  I’m not sure that they are, or should be, worth 8% of the total course grade, but they were great exercises in professional review and critique.

Overall, I enjoyed the case analysis project.  I enjoyed researching my topic, and learning much more about the operator training aspects of unmanned systems, and specifically the MQ-4C Triton.  In my current position as an HSI Analyst, I assist in the writing of Navy Training System Publications; not papers such as case analyses, peer reviews, etc.  However, the experience gained through this process can definitely be put to use.  And who knows what the future may hold.

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Crew Member Selection

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Crew Member Selection

Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator training, qualification and certification are complex and vital issues.  In fact, they have been identified as “…major issues facing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)…” (Mirot, 2013, p. 19).  Until recently, the only operator requirements provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been the Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the U.S. National Airspace System, which was published nearly a decade ago.  Section 9.0 of the guidance “…addresses the qualifications of UAS pilots, observers, maintainers, and other personnel as appropriate” (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2008, p. 14).  In February 2015, the FAA “…proposed a framework of regulations that would allow routine use of certain small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in today’s aviation system, while maintaining flexibility to accommodate future technological innovations” (FAA, 2015b, para. 1).  The proposed rules apply to small UAS (sUAS) that weigh less than 55 pounds and conduct non-recreational operations (FAA, 2015b).  In addition to aircraft requirements and operational requirements, limits and restrictions, the proposed rules also address operator certification requirements and responsibilities (FAA, 2015b).  These requirements are outlined in Section I.B of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and are discussed in detail in Section III.E (FAA, 2015a).

Training, Qualification and Certification Requirements

There are many general knowledge, skills and abilities that UAS operators, regardless of platform, must possess in order to ensure the safe and successful operation of the system.  For example, operators should be well versed in the laws, regulations, directives, etc. that are applicable within the airspace in which they operating (Bishop, 2003).  They must also understand airspace integration requirements, and be capable of interacting with both manned and unmanned aircraft operating in their vicinity (Bishop, 2003).  They must be proficient at management, risk assessment, problem solving and decision making; and be able to effectively and efficiently coordinate, collaborate, and communicate, both internally and externally (Paylas et al., 2009).  Finally, in addition to these general requirements, all operators must have platform-specific training that includes normal, non-routine and emergency procedures (Mirot, 2013).

Insitu ScanEagle

The Insitu ScanEagle is an autonomous system that can operate in both land and maritime environments (Insitu, n.d.).  The aircraft is approximately five feet in length, and has a wingspan of approximately 10 feet (Insitu, n.d.).  It is classified as a sUAS due to its maximum takeoff weight of approximately 50 pounds and cruise speed of 50-60 knots (FAA, 2015a, Insitu, n.d.).  It is capable of autonomous flight, or can be flown either manually or via computer from a portable ground control station (GCS; Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  As a sUAS, operations of the ScanEagle require a Standard or Blanket Certificate of Authorization (COA; FAA, 2015c), must remain below 500 feet, and must remain within visual line-of-sight (LOS) of the operator or a qualified observer (FAA, 2015a).  In accordance with the FAA’s interim guidance (FAA, 2008) and NPRM (FAA, 2015a), operators must:

·       Be a minimum of 17 years of age.

·       Successfully receive general aviation training and pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test.  A recurrent knowledge test must be successfully completed every 24 months as well.

·       Possess a pilot certificate.

·       Possess an unmanned operator certificate with a sUAS rating.

·       Possess a current Class 2 medical certificate.

General Atomics Ikhana

The General Atomics Ikhana is a variant of the company’s Predator B.  It has a maximum takeoff weight of 10,500 pounds, typically operates at altitudes greater than 40,000 feet, can operate via LOS or satellite command and control (C2) links, and requires a runway for launch and recovery (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2008).  Ikhana operations require a Standard COA and, when operating in Class A airspace, are required to operate under instrument flight rules (FAA, 2015c).  In accordance with the FAA’s interim guidance (FAA, 2008), operators must:

·       Possess a pilot certificate with an instrument flight rating.

·       Possess a current Class 2 medical certificate.

·       Complete platform-specific training, to “…include manufacturer specific training (or military equivalent), demonstrated proficiency, and testing in the UAS being operated” (FAA, 2008, p. 16).

Personnel Recommendations

For the both the ScanEagle and Ikhana, it is recommended that a minimum of two operators (e.g., one pilot and one sensor operator) be used for each shift/mission.  Mission endurance will need to be determined, and crew rotation schedules will need to be consider in order to determine the total number of operators required for each platform.  It is also recommended that the pilots and sensor operators have the same training and certifications required for their respective platforms in order to provide redundancy at each position in the event that one of the operators becomes incapacitated during a flight.  In addition, a qualified observer is required per shift/mission for ScanEagle operations.  Finally, it is recommended that a mission coordinator, or planner, be assigned for each platform in order to oversee all aspects of crew missions, assignments, rotations, etc.

References

Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu

Bishop, S. (2003, September). Training for unmanned systems. Unmanned Systems, 21(5), 28-31.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2008, March 13). Unmanned aircraft systems operations in the U.S. national airspace system. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/faq/media/uas_guidance08-01.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (2015a). Notice of proposed rulemaking: Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published/media/2120-AJ60_NPRM_2-15-2015_joint_signature.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (2015b, February 15). Press release: DOT and FAA propose new rules for small unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295

Federal Aviation Administration. (2015c, October 27). Unmanned aircraft operation in the national airspace system (NAS). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_JO_7210.889_Unmanned_Aircraft_Operations_in_the_NAS.pdf

Insitu. (n.d.). Unmanned Systems. Retrieved March 2, 1016 from http://www.insitu.com/information-delivery/unmanned-systems

Mirot, A. (2013). The future of unmanned aircraft systems pilot qualifications. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 22(3), 19-30. Retrieved from http://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol22/iss3/7

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2008, October 3). Large UAS Aircraft. Retrieved from https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/ESCD/ikhana.html#.VteuFxFViko

Pavlas, D., Burke, C., Fiore, S., Salas, E., Jensen, R., and Fu, D. (2009). Enhancing unmanned aerial system training: A taxonomy of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and methods. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 53(26), 1903-1907. Retrieved from http://pro.sagepub.com/content/53/26.toc

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool for the DJI Phantom 3 Advanced Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS)

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool for the

DJI Phantom 3 Advanced Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS)

The DJI Phantom 3 quadcopter is a commercial small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) used for aerial video and photography.  The Phantom 3 is available in three model configurations: Standard, Advanced, and Professional (DJI, 2015).  The features discussed below pertain to both the Advanced and Professional models; however, only the Advanced is specifically addressed in this paper. 

The Phantom 3 Advanced is capable of auto takeoff and landing, as well as various levels of automatic flight, using both GPS and GLONASS satellite positioning (DJI, 2015).  When satellite signal is not available, the aircraft can use its barometer to maintain altitude, or ultrasound and image data to maintain its current position (DJI, 2015).  The Phantom 3 Advanced features three flight safety modes: Smart Return-to-Home (RTH), Low Battery RTH, and Failsafe RTH (DJI, 2015).  The Smart RTH automatically returns the aircraft to the last recorded home point (DJI, 2015).  The Low Battery RTH notifies the user to RTH or land immediately in the event of a low battery condition (DJI, 2015).  The aircraft will automatically return to the last recorded home point if no user action is taken within ten seconds (DJI, 2015).  The Failsafe RTH will automatically return the aircraft to the last recorded home point if remote controller signal is lost for more than three seconds (DJI, 2015).  The Phantom 3 Advanced also offers five Intelligent Orientation Control (IOC), or flight modes, which automatically “lock” the control orientation of the aircraft (DJI, 2015).  According to the DJI website (http://www.dji.com/product/intelligent-flight-modes) these include:

·       Course Lock (CL), in which the nose direction of the aircraft remains the “forward” direction regardless of the orientation or position of the,

·       Home lock (HL), in which the forward and backward controls move the aircraft farther from or closer to, respectively, the recorded home point regardless of aircraft orientation, 

·       Point of Interest (POI), in which the aircraft circle a recorded POI with the nose of the aircraft always pointed toward the POI,

·       Waypoints, in which the aircraft automatically follows a preprogrammed flight path, and

·       Follow Me, in which the aircraft automatically follows the user, keeping the user in the camera’s view at all times.

Finally, the Phantom 3 Advanced features a No Fly Zone (NFZ) informational feature that helps users avoid inadvertent operation in restricted areas

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment

An Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment was conducted for the Phantom 3 Advanced in order to identify risks associated with the aircraft’s operation.  An ORM Assessment Tool was then developed, based on a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), a Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) and an Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A) of the Phantom 3 Advanced sUAS, in order to provide users with a checklist of conditions and/or events that can used to help mitigate human factors errors associated with the operation of the aircraft during all stages of flight.

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

The PHL is simply a “…brainstorming tool used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS operation” (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012, p. 124), and can be used to evaluate the five main stages of flight: planning, staging, launching, flight and recovery (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  Hazards for each stage are identified, and the probability and severity of each is estimated (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  Finally, the risk level (RL) is established based on the probabilities and severities that have been identified (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The PHL for the Phantom 3 Advanced, which combines all stages of flight, is listed in Table A1.

Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA)

Once the PHL is complete, the PHA is done to identify methods to mitigate the hazards that have been identified (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The PHA lists the mitigating action to reduce the probability and severity of the hazard, and the new, or residual risk level (RRL), resulting from the mitigating action (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The PHA also lists any special notes, instructions, etc. that may be required to implement the mitigating action (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The PHA for the Phantom 3 Advanced is included in Table A1.  Based on the results for the PHL/A and the risk assessment matrix listed in MIL-STD-882D/E, the risk assessment code (RAC) assigned for each hazard identified is Low.

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)

The OHR&A analyzes the hazards identified, and mitigating actions implemented, in the PHL/A (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  If the mitigating action is deemed to not be adequate or the hazard has not changed, then the hazard is relisted (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  Additionally, if the mitigating action has altered the hazard, the new hazard is listed (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The OHR&A for the Phantom 3 Advanced is shown in Table A2.  Based on the results for the OHR&A and the risk assessment matrix listed in MIL-STD-882D/E, the RAC assigned for each hazard identified is Low.

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool

As stated by Barnhart, Marshall and Shappee (2012), the risk assessment tool is a decision-making tool that “…provides the UAS/RPA operator with a quick look at the operation before committing to the flight activity (a go/no-go decision)” (p. 128), and “…allows safety and management of real-time information needed to continually monitor the overall safety of the operation” (p. 128).  The assessment tool is developed using hazards identified in the PHL/A as well as inputs concerning operational factors from all personnel involved in the operation (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  Once these factors have been identified, they are evaluated in terms of probability and severity for each stage of flight, and individual and overall risk values are assigned (Barnhart, Marshall, & Shappee, 2012).  The ORM assessment tool for the Phantom 3 Advanced can be seen in Table A3.

 References

Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu

Department of Defense. (2012, May 11). Department of Defense standard practice: System Safety. Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/683694/file/75173/MIL-STD-882E%20Final%202012-05-11.pdf

DJI. (2015, April). Phantom 3 Advanced User Manual (v1.0). Retrieved from http://download.dji-innovations.com/downloads/phantom_3/en/Phantom_3_Advanced_User_Manual_v1.0_en.pdf

 Appendix A

Table A1

Preliminary Hazard List and Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHL/A)

Stage	Track #	Hazard	Probability	Severity	RL	Mitigating Action	RRL	Notes
Planning	1	Inaccurate or incorrect waypoints entered	Remote	Negligible	19	Waypoint validation by a second individual	20
Staging	2	All components not fully charged	Remote	Negligible	19	Follow Preflight Checklist provided in User Manual	20
Staging	3	Compass not calibrated	Occasional	Negligible	18	Follow User Manual guidance and procedure for compass calibration	20	Warning indication given on controller.
Launch	4	Launch/ attempted launch of aircraft within a safety zone	Remote	Negligible	19	Verify location in relation to established safety zones.	20
Launch	5	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	6	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	7	Compass error	Remote	Negligible	19	Follow User Manual guidance and procedure	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	8	Deteriorating weather conditions	Occasional	Negligible	18	Verify weather conditions in operating area.  Enable Smart RTH as required.	19
Recovery	9	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller

Note.  Assessments based on the Severity categories and probability levels listed in MIL-STD-882D/E

Table A2

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)

Stage	Track #	Action Review	Probability	Severity	RL	Mitigating Action	RRL	Notes
Planning	1	Waypoint validation by a second individual	Improbable	Negligible	20		20
Staging	2	Follow Preflight Checklist provided in User Manual	Improbable	Negligible	20		20
Staging	3	Follow User Manual guidance and procedure for compass calibration	Improbable	Negligible	20		20
Launch	4	Verify launch location in relation to established safety zones.	Improbable	Negligible	20		20
Launch	5	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	6	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	7	Compass error	Remote	Negligible	19	Follow User Manual guidance and procedure	19	Warning indication given on controller
Flight	8	Verify weather conditions in operating area.  Enable Smart RTH as required.	Remote	Negligible	19		19
Recovery	9	Lost signal/link with controller	Remote	Negligible	19	None - Aircraft Failsafe RTH applies	19	Warning indication given on controller

Note.  Assessments based on the Severity categories and probability levels listed in MIL-STD-882D/E

Table A3

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool

Conditions	1	2	3	4
Aircraft Condition	Damaged, repairs not made or questionable	Damaged, repairs made	Batteries low, Compass not calibrated	No issues
User Skill Level	Novice	Intermediate	Advanced	Expert
Flight Plan/Mode	Course Lock (CL)	Waypoint (waypoints not validated)	HL, POI, ‘Follow Me’	Waypoint (waypoints validated)
Line of Sight (LOS)	Numerous Obstructions	Some Obstructions	Potential Obstructions	Unobstructed
Environment and Terrain	Urban (operating w/in close proximity to structures)	Urban (NOT operating w/in close proximity to structures)	Rural (operating w/in close proximity to large terrain features)	Rural (operating in open space)
Weather Conditions	Low Ceiling, High winds, Gog/Haze	Mostly cloudy, Gusty winds	Mostly clear, Light wind w/ no gusts	Clear, Calm
Airspace	Near restricted area	Near populated area	Authorized area, in vicinity of other UAS	Authorized and open area

                                               

Note.  Individual risk levels are defined as 1 (High), 2 (Serious), 3 (Moderate) and 4 (Low).  Overall risk levels are defined as 7-10 (High), 11-17 (Serious), 18-24 (Moderate) and 25-28 (Low).