Tuesday, March 8, 2016

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Human Factors, Ethics and Morality
The history of aviation began, essentially, with the use of unmanned aircraft (UA; Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Their use as a tool of war has evolved from hot air balloons, gliders, “aerial torpedoes” with early (e.g., crude) autopilots, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and, finally, autonomous UA (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  This evolution is not unlike the evolution of other, more common, methods of warfare.  For example, armed conflict has evolved from using swords/spears/arrows, to guns/cannons, to artillery/aircraft/bombs, to smart bombs/missiles/cruise missiles.  As technology advances, the tools of war advance.  Drone warfare is simply the next step in this evolution.  However, this next step is not an easy or straightforward one to take.
Discussion
The use of UA in combat presents a number of human factors issues, and ethical and moral dilemmas for those that employ them.
Human Factors
While there are a number of human factors issues associated with the use of drones, especially in a combat environment, a significant issue is the lack of the “human” element.  The major concern is, specifically, the absence of a pilot physically in the aircraft.  There are times in combat situations where it is advantageous, if not necessary, to have a pilot present in order to make decisions, act and/or react based on factors, conditions and information that may not be available or apparent to the operator of a UA (Stewart, 2011).  Additionally, in a manned aircraft, the pilot is able to orient himself as necessary in the cockpit (Schneider & MacDonald, 2014).  This allows the pilot to alter his point of view as the situation dictates, resulting in a larger, more continuous field of view, as opposed to the “soda straw” effect that can result from the limited field of view of the UA’s sensors (Schneider & MacDonald, 2014).  Finally, in addition to superior visual information and cues, pilots in manned aircraft also have the advantage of other perceptual cues such as auditory, olfactory, tactile, and vestibular cues which are typically not available to an operator of a UAS (Salas & Maurino, 2009).  This lack of physical influences and indicators can present a unique challenge to UAS operators, especially when having to assess problems or respond to unplanned or unexpected situations and/or events.
Ethics and Morality
The issue of warfare in and of itself raises a number of ethical and moral issues and concerns.  Add drones into the equation, and the issues and concerns become even more convoluted.  A significant concern, or rather fear, of drone warfare that is generated from the human factors issue discussed previously is that of autonomous “killer drones.”  Basically, people are afraid of drones that are able to search for and identify a target, specifically a human target, and, based solely on internal programing, determine whether or not to engage the target.  Such a system would have to have a very high level of autonomy (LoA; Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Specifically, the system would have to have very little, if any interaction with humans, even performing at a human level (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  Obviously, this is not a concern with manned aircraft.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has policies in place to ensure that killer drones don’t become a reality on the battlefield.  Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, “...assigns responsibilities for the...use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2012, p. 1).  Two key elements of the directive (DOD, 2012) include:
·        “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force” (p. 2)
·        Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE). (p. 3)
These elements define the parameters of UAS use within the constraints of the law of war, which “...regulates the conduct of armed hostilities” (DoD, 2016, p. 139), and ROE, which “...delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (DoD, 2016, p. 207).
Conclusion
The utilization of drones on the battlefield reduces the number of personnel that are required to be placed “in harm’s way” in order to engage a target.  I believe that the continued use of drones is essential to national defense strategies, but only as long as they are employed within the constraints of the law of war and ROE.  Additionally, regulations governing the use of autonomous systems, such as those outlined in DODD 3000.09, are vital to ensure the moral, ethical and lawful use of drones in combat situations.  Finally, improvements in technologies will help mitigate risks due to the lack of the human element.  However, as capabilities increase, so will the fear of the killer drones.  It’s a very fine line that must be walked in this next step of modern warfare.
  
References
Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu
Department of Defense. (2012, November 21). Autonomy in weapon systems (DoD Directive 3000.09). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf
Department of Defense. (2016, January 15). Dictionary of military and associated terms (Joint Publication 1-02). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
Salas, E., & Maurino, D. (Eds.). (2009). Human Factors in Aviation (2nd Edition). Burlington, MA, USA: Academic Press.
Schneider, J., & MacDonald, J. (2014, June 16). Are manned or unmanned aircraft better on the battlefield? Retrieved from http://ciceromagazine.com/features/the-ground-truth-about-drones-manned-vs-unmanned-effectiveness-on-the-battlefield/

Stewart, J. (2011, September 12). Analysts say UAV progress won't kill aviation. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110912/NEWS/109120332/Analysts-say-UAV-progress-won-t-kill-aviation

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