Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) Ground Control Systems (GCS)

Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) Ground Control Systems (GCS)

Ground Control Systems

The primary objectives of the Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program was not only to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) into carrier operations, but to also evolve and mature the technologies involved with launching, recovering and controlling the aircraft in carrier controlled airspace operations.  Included among these technologies were the UAS ground control systems (GCSs), which consist of mission operator control and flight deck control (Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), n.d.; USS Theodore Roosevelt Public Affairs, 2013).

Mission Operator Control

The Northrop Grumman X-47B, developed under contract as the Navy’s UCAS-D platform, is a smart, fully autonomous, unmanned system.  Like current manned aircraft, the X-47B is capable of launching from, and being recovered by, an aircraft carrier; using inputs from internal computers and sensors, as well as inputs from operators, sensors, etc. onboard the carrier.  The flight path and mission of the X-47B are preprogrammed, and are executed, or “flown,” by the onboard computer.  Navigation of the aircraft is accomplished via a hybrid system consisting of embedded global positioning system/inertial navigation system (EGI) and vision-based technology.  While the onboard computer is responsible flight and mission execution, it does not control the X-47B in that it does not generate its own instructions or deviate from its preprogrammed instructions unless directed to do so by the mission operator.  The mission operator monitors system operations and makes changes, corrections, etc. to the flight path and/or mission as necessary using keyboard commands.  Therefore, the mission operator always knows, and is ultimately in control of, the system’s flight path and mission (Dillow, 2013; Honeywell Aerospace, 2015; Naval Technology, n.d.; Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2012).

Flight Deck Control

During flight operations, the X-47B must be able to safely maneuver around an aircraft carrier’s crowded and hectic flight deck while maintaining the operational tempo of launches and recoveries.  To accomplish this, the X-47B uses a handheld wireless control display unit (CDU), which gives a deck operator the ability to manipulate the aircraft’s throttle, steering, brakes, etc., in order to perform the numerous actions required with maneuvering an aircraft on a carrier’s flight deck.  Like a manned aircraft, the X-47B is guided around the flight deck by a flight deck director standing in front of the aircraft and using traditional hand signals to communicate when, where and how an aircraft should move.  However, instead of an onboard pilot responding to the signals and maneuvering the aircraft, a flight deck operator standing behind the flight deck director uses the CDU to control the aircraft based on the director’s instructions (Cenciotti, 2012; Quick, 2012; Skillings, 2012).  In addition to the CDU,

Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have developed a system that allows a camera and computer to recognize the hand signals sailors use to guide unmanned aerial vehicles around the flight deck, a feat that could eventually enable sailors to move a UAV with little more than a wave. (Stewart, 2012, para. 2)

Discussion

Human Factors Issues

Two primary human factors issues that are of concern with UAS are the “human factor” and cyber susceptibility and vulnerability.  In a manned aircraft, the presence of the pilot offers various advantages in such areas as field of view (sensor limitations), situational awareness, and unplanned situations and events.  Not all situations, such as unplanned targets, threats and/or conditions, can be anticipated or planned for; therefore, human intuition and cognizance, not a sensor, is better equipped to make decisions based on information and/or “...visual, auditory, proprioceptive, tactile, and olfactory sensory cues...” (Jones, Harron, Hoffa, Lyall & Wilson, 2012, p. 98) that may not be available to the controller/operator of a UAS.

A second issue is cyber susceptibility and vulnerability.  The primary link between a UAS and operator is via direct, line-of-sight (LOS), or indirect satellite communication.  These wireless, extended lines of communication provide multiple “soft” access points that are more vulnerable to atmospheric interference, system malfunctions (e.g., lost links) and manipulation or exploitation by unauthorized personnel (e.g., hacking) (Hartmann & Steup, 2013; Stewart, 2011).

Mitigation of Risks

A potential method of mitigating the risk due to the loss of situational awareness for the UAS operator is the incorporation of additional sensors, cameras, displays, etc. in the aircraft and mission operator control station.  However, these additions, intended to compensate for both the loss of sensory cues and a real-time outside view, may introduce additional issues or risks “...in terms of breadth of visual field, image quality, timeliness of information, and attention requirements for pilot monitoring tasks” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 98).  Additionally, these additions “...could provide potential for overloading the visual sensory channel” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 98).

The reliability and security of the data/control link is another critical UAS human factors issue.  While cyber security was not one of the technologies that the X-47B is responsible for testing or demonstrating, the aircraft did undergo extensive Naval Electromagnetic Radiation Facility (NERF) testing in order to identify, and correct, potential electromagnetic interference (EMI) issues.  While there remains lingering, and legitimate, concerns about cybersecurity, ways to mitigate actual, and potential, risks must be continuously addressed and developed in the future (Dillow, 2013; Jones et al., 2012; NAVAIR, 2012).

Conclusion

The use of UASs in carrier operations has been successfully demonstrated through the Navy’s UCAS-D program; specifically, through the X-47B.  However, there remain significant concerns with the program.  These include integration of the UAS into a true operational environment and tempo, operator situational awareness, and UAS and GCS cybersecurity.  While there are potential ways to mitigate these risks, additional concerns and risks are introduced.  As technology advances and UAS capabilities will expand, and new risks will be identified.

  References

Cenciotti, D. (2012, December 11). Video of unmanned combat air system X-47B taxi at sea shows the future of Naval aviation. The Aviationist. Retrieved from http://theaviationist.com/2012/12/11/video-x47b-truman/

Dillow, C. (2013, July 5). What the X-47B reveals about the future of autonomous flight. Popular Science. Retrieved from http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/five-things-you-need-know-about-x-47b-and-coming-era-autonomous-flight

Hartmann, K., & Steup, C. (2013). The Vulnerability of UAVs to Cyber Attacks - An Approach to the Risk Assessment. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings/d3r2s2_hartmann.pdf

Honeywell Aerospace. (2015, April 22). Honeywell technologies play critical role in aviation first for unmanned aircraft. Retrieved from https://aerospace.honeywell.com/about/media-resources/newsroom/honeywell-technologies-play-critical-role

Jones, E., Harron, G., Hoffa, B., Lyall, B. & Wilson, J. (2012, December 31). Research project: Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) ground control station (GCS) design. Retrieved from http://www.researchintegrations.com/publications/Jones_etal_2012_Human-Factors-Guidelines-for-UAS-GCS-Design_Year-1.pdf

Naval Air Systems Command. (n.d.). Unmanned combat air system demonstration. Retrieved January 20, 2016, from http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=7468CDCC-8A55-4D30-95E3-761683359B26

Naval Air Systems Command. (2012, May 15). X-47B gears up for summer milestones. Retrieved from http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.NAVAIRNewsStory&id=4995

Naval Technology. (n.d.). X-47B unmanned combat air system carrier (UCAS), United States of America. Retrieved January 20, 2016 from http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/x-47b-unmanned-combat-air-system-carrier-ucas/

Northrop Grumman Corporation. (2012, December 19).  Unmanned combat air system carrier demonstration (UCAS-D). Retrieved from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/X-47B_Navy_UCAS_FactSheet.pdf

USS Theodore Roosevelt Public Affairs. (2013, November 10). X-47B operates aboard Theodore Roosevelt. Retrieved from http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=77580

Quick, D. (2012, November 15). Wireless, handheld device for ground control of X-47B unmanned aircraft used. Gizmag. Retrieved from http://www.gizmag.com/x-47b-ground-remote-control/25049/

Skillings, J. (2012, November 15). Carrier-bound X-47B drone passes remote-control test. CNET. Retrieved from http://www.cnet.com/news/carrier-bound-x-47b-drone-passes-remote-control-test/

Stewart, J. (2011, September 12). Analysts say UAV progress won't kill aviation. Navy Times. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110912/NEWS/109120332/Analysts-say-UAV-progress-won-t-kill-aviation
Stewart, J. (2012, Aprill 1). The next step in directing drones: Hand signals. Navy Times. Retrieved from http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20120401/NEWS/204010308/The-next-step-in-directing-drones-hand-signals