MQ-4C Triton
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Operations
The Northrop Grumman
MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a maritime variant of the Air
Force’s high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) RQ-4B Global Hawk (Government
Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). The
Triton, previously known as the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, is
a component of the Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) family of
systems (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2014). It “…is intended to provide persistent
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability” (GAO,
2015, p. 115) in order to increase the intelligence capability and situational
awareness of tactical, operational and strategic units (NAVAIR, 2014). Triton mission capabilities include, but are
not limited to:
·
Maritime and port
surveillance,
· Battle damage assessment,
· Support of maritime and littoral operations, and
·
Communication relay
(NAVAIR, 2014).
MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operations
Infrastructure
Once fully operational, two operational
squadrons will operate and maintain the MQ-4C UAS, which consists of the MQ-4C
unmanned aircraft (UA), Mission Control Systems (MCS) and service support
systems (SS), from two Main Operating Bases (MOB)
(NAVAIR, 2014).
The MOB will, in turn, support a total of five Forward Operating Bases
(FOB) (NAVAIR, 2014). The MOB MCS, designated MD-3A, will be
permanently located within the Continental United States (CONUS) at MPRF fleet
concentration centers on the East and West coasts (NAVAIR, 2014). Each MD-3A
consists of a primary and secondary MCS, with each MCS manned by three air
vehicle operators (AVO), one each for launch and recovery, transit and mission;
two mission payload operators (MPO); a tactical coordinator (TC); a Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) coordinator (SC); and two system administrators (SA)
(NAVAIR, 2014).
The FOB MCS, designated MD-3B, is a scaled down version of the MD-3A which
will be deployed to operational theaters (NAVAIR, 2014). Although
capable of performing other functions, the MD-3A will be used primarily for UA command
and control (C2) during launch and recovery operations (NAVAIR, 2014). Each MD-3B
consists of a single MCS manned by two AVOs and a SA (NAVAIR, 2014).
Manning Requirements
To the greatest extent possible, the MQ-4C
UAS operational manning requirements have been designed to use capabilities and
skill levels that currently exist within the Navy’s manpower structure (NAVAIR, 2014). The AVO will be a qualified Naval Aviator
with an additional MQ-4C aviator qualification designation (NAVAIR, 2014;
Navy Personnel Command [NAVPERS], 2015b). Additionally, “as required by the Federal
Aviation Administration, this position is filled by a pilot that maintains an
instrument rating” (NAVAIR, 2014, p.
I-26). The TC is a qualified Naval
Flight Officer (NFO), also with an additional MQ-4C aviator qualification
designation (NAVAIR, 2014; NAVPERS, 2015b). Initially, qualified Naval
Aircrewman Operators (AWO), with specific, established Navy Enlistment
Classification (NEC) codes will be utilized for the MPO (NAVAIR, 2014; NAVPERS,
2015a). A
new NEC code has been established specifically for the MQ-4C UAS MPO, but has
not yet been activated (NAVAIR, 2014; NAVPERS, 2015a). The SC is not
an aircrew position, but rather a data analyst required for specific
missions/operations (NAVAIR, 2014).
Command and Control
Like the Global Hawk, the Triton is
capable of operating via line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight (BLOS)
command and control (C2) links (NAVAIR, 2014).
A minimum of two C2 links, one primary link and one back-up link, are
required between the UA and the MCS in control (NAVAIR, 2014). Narrow bandwidth (NB) satellite communication
(SATCOM) and LOS communications links are used to transmit C2 data only, while wide
bandwidth (WB) SATCOM and LOS links are used for C2, sensor management and
sensor data (NAVAIR, 2014). Only the
MD-3A includes WB BLOS SATCOM capability for C2. The C2 architecture used in the MQ-4C “…provides
connectivity to existing and emerging United States Navy (USN) and DoD communications
infrastructure…” (NAVAIR, 2014, p. I-15).
The MQ-4C is launched by a qualified AVO located at the MD-3B
within the specific area of operations (NAVAIR, 2014). At a pre-determined point along the
flightpath, C2 is passed to the AVO located at the MD-3A designated for BLOS
transit and mission execution (NAVAIR, 2014).
Command and control is returned to the AVO located at the MD-3B once the
UA is within LOS of the FOB airfield (NAVAIR, 2014). Due to the inherent latencies in BLOS C2, LOS
is preferred for launch, recovery and ground taxi operations (NAVAIR, 2014). Voice communication with external airspace
control agencies occur via voice communications coupled to radios on the UA,
making communication with a MQ-4C AVO similar to communication with a pilot on
a manned aircraft (NAVAIR, 2014).
Discussion
Beyond line of sight operation is essential to the Triton’s
mission of providing long-range, persistent maritime ISR. An advantage of BLOS operation is that, unlike
LOS, the UA is not required to remain within a specific range from the MCS
throughout the mission (Barnhart, Shappee & Marshall, 2011; Salas &
Maurino, 2010). Disadvantages of BLOS
operation, however, include inherent latencies and the greater potential for
the C2 link to be interrupted, jammed, compromised or lost (Barnhart, Shappee
& Marshall, 2011; Salas & Maurino, 2010). Inherent delays are a result of “…the many
relays and systems…” (Barnhart, Shappee & Marshall, 2011, p. 24) that C2
signals must pass through. If the C2
link is lost, the MQ-4C “…is capable of an autonomous emergency landing at
preplanned / pre-surveyed airfields” (NAVAIR, 2014, p. I-8). Whether operating using LOS or BLOS, the
MQ-4C operates autonomously within the framework of a planned mission profile,
which “…contains a route of flight, communications plan, sensor operation plan,
and a full set of preplanned contingencies to account for system anomalies or
failures” (NAVAIR, 2014, p. I-8). The
AVO is also capable of manually adjusting the flight path at any time during
the flight or mission (NAVAIR, 2014).
A
human factors issue that may arise when transitioning between LOS and BLOS,
i.e., when switching control of the UA from the FOB to the MOB and back, is the
increased potential for mishaps due to decreased situational awareness,
procedural errors and/or improper configurations between control stations (Salas & Maurino, 2010; Tvaryanas, 2006). As Tvaryanas (2006) points out:
Indeed, migration of
control may well constitute a critical and potentially high workload phase for
UAS operators.27 For example,
several military UAS mishaps have occurred either directly during or indirectly
as the result of 11 changeovers or handoffs.27,51,66 In handing off control between stations,
mishaps have resulted when the station receiving control was improperly
configured.66 During
changeovers, mishaps have resulted because of the new operator’s decreased
systems awareness.51 More
broadly, there is concern for an acute decrement in crew situational awareness
when control is transferred to a crew not currently involved in the ongoing
mission. (pp. 10-11)
Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulatory restrictions currently restrict UAS
access to the national airspace system (NAS; Salas & Maurino, 2010). Once issues are adequately addressed, and
risks are effectively mitigated, potential commercial applications for BLOS UAS
operations could include security operations, search and rescue, monitoring and
survey operations, disaster management and communications (Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Systems Association, 2016).
References
Barnhart,
R. K., Shappee, E., & Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved
from http://www.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu
Government
Accountability Office. (2015, March). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of
selected weapon programs. Document No. GAO-15-342SP. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668986.pdf#page=123
Naval
Air Systems Command. (2014, October). Navy
training system plan for the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system (UAS).
Document No. N2N68-NTSP-A-50-0403A/A.
Navy
Personnel Command. (2015a, October). Manual
of Navy enlisted manpower and personnel classifications and occupational
standards, volume II: Navy Enlisted Classifications (NECs). Document No.
NAVPERS 18068F.
Navy
Personnel Command. (2015b, October). Manual
of Navy officer manpower and personnel classifications, volume I: Major code structures.
Document No. NAVPERS 15839I.
Salas,
E., & Maurino, D. (Eds.). (2009). Human Factors in Aviation (2nd Edition).
Burlington, MA, USA: Academic Press.
Tvaryanas,
A. P. (2006, February). Human factors Considerations in Migration of unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) operator control. Document No. HSW-PE-BR-TR-2006-0002.
Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090121-046.pdf
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Systems Association. (2016). Civil and commercial UAS
applications. Retrieved from https://www.uavs.org/commercial
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